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NOTES
"UPPING THE ANTE" AGAINST THE DEFENDANT WHO
SUCCESSFULLY ATTACKS HIS GUILTY PLEA: DOUBLE
JEOPARDY AND DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS
I. Introduction
The vast majority of all criminal convictions in the United States district
courts are the results of guilty pleas. For example, the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice reported that 90.2 percent of
the convictions in federal courts in 1964 were by pleas of guilty.1 The proportion
in the state courts is similarly high.2 However, because a plea of guilty constitutes
a waiver of, inter alia, the fundamental rights to a trial by jury,' to remain silent,"
to present witnesses in one's defense,5 to confront one's accusers,6 and to be con-
victed by proof beyond all reasonable doubt," courts have treated the guilty plea
as "a serious and sobering occasion. '  Consequently, the Supreme Court has
long recognized that, upon timely application, a guilty plea should be vacated
where it is "shown to have been unfairly obtained or given through ignorance,
fear or inadvertence."' However, once the guilty plea is withdrawn .or vacated,
the problem arises whether the recharging discretion of the prosecuting authority
has in any way been affected by the prior plea procedure. For example, where
the defendant has pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense and his plea is later
withdrawn or otherwise voided, can the prosecutor recharge the greater offense,
or is he limited to the offense to which the defendant had previously pleaded?
The concern of this note is with the conflicting rationales employed and results
obtained by those federal courts' ° which have attempted to resolve this issue.
1 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force
Report: The Courts 9 (1967).
2 E.g., in 1964, guilty pleas accounted for 95.5 percent of all criminal convictions in the
trial courts of general jurisdiction in New York. In 1965, the figure for California was 74 per-
cent. Id.
3 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
4 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
5 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
6 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
7 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
8 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 (1971) (concurring opinion).
9 Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927) (dictum). Although the Court
was there opining in reference to pleas of guilty in federal courts, as more fundamental rights
began to be applied to the states, the Court extended this protection to the state defendant.
See, e.g., Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) (state defendant held entitled to assistance
of counsel when pleading guilty); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (trial court
required to interrogate the defendant who enters a plea of guilty so that the waiver of funda-
mental rights will affirmatively appear in the record).
10 Several state decisions are also directed to this problem. See, e.g., State v. Russo, 299
So.2d 40 (Fla. 1974); People v. McMiller, 389 Mich. 425, 208 N.W.2d 451 (1973); State v.
Asinakis, 195 N.W.2d 407 (S.D. 1972); Commonwealth v. Therrein, 359 Mass. 500, 269
N.E.2d 687 (1971); State v. Wolf, 46 N.J. 301, 216 A.2d 586 (1966); State v. Satterlee, 58
Wash.2d 92, 361 P.2d 168 (1961); People v. Home, 21 Ill. App.3d 10, 314 N.E.2d 633(1974); State v. Myers, 12 Ariz. App. 409, 471 P.2d 294 (1970); People v. Wolfson, 32
A.D.2d 813, 302 N.Y.S. 2d 217 (1969); State v. Rhein, 117 N.J. Super. 112, 283 A.2d 759(1971). Additionally, all states have some form of local constitutional or common law prohi-
bition of double jeopardy. Note, Twice in jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 262-63 (1965).
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I The Supreme Court has not resolved the conflict. However, the federal
courts that have ruled have resolved the issue on the basis of the propriety vel
non of an analogy to or an extension of two Supreme Court decisions: Green v.
United States and North Carolina U. Pearce."
In Green, the Court held that where a defendant had been tried for first-
degree murder and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder,
the defendant had been impliedly acquitted" of murder in the first degree and
a second trial on that charge violated the fifth amendment prohibition of double
jeopardy.'4 In so holding, the Court rejected the contention that Green had
waived his defense of double jeopardy by choosing to appeal his second-degree
murder conviction, stating:
The law should not, and in our judgment does not, place the defendant
in such an incredible dilemma. Conditioning an appeal of one offense on
a coerced surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense
exacts a forfeiture in plain conflict with the constitutional bar against double
jeopardy.' 5
In North Carolina v. Pearce,6 the Court was faced with the constitutionality
vel non of a court's imposing a more severe sentence on the "successful" am
pellant after his retrial. While noting that it had long been established 7 that the
guarantee against double jeopardy "imposes no limitations whatever upon the
power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in getting his first conviction set
aside,"' 8 the Court pointed out that it is patently unconstitutional to penalize
those who choose to exercise their constitutional rights. Furthermore, "the very
threat inherent in the existence of such a punitive policy would, with respect to
those still in prison, serve to 'chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights.' ""s
Hence, the Court held that while neither the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment nor the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment
imposes an absolute bar to a more severe sentence upon reconviction, 0 the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that:
11 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
12 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
13 The seminal antecedents of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy were
the common law pleas of autrefois acquit (former acquittal) and autrefois convict (former
conviction). See generally Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am. J. LEGAx. Hxsr. 283
(1963); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262 (1965). In Green the defendant was
held entitled to the benefit of the plea autrefois acquit or implied acquittal.
14 The Court had previously held in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), that the
federal double jeopardy standards were not binding on the states unless there was a showing
of "hardship so acute that our policy will not endure it." Id. at 328. Since Green involved
violations of the District of Columbia Code, the viability of Palko was not there in issue. Sub-
sequently, however, in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), Palko was reconsidered
and the Court held: "[W]e today find that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amend-
ment represents a fundamental ideal in our Constitutional heritage, and that it should apply
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Insofar as it is inconsistent with this hold-
ing, Palko v. Connecticut is overruled." Id. at 794.
15 355 U.S. at 193-94 (footnote omitted).
16 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Pearce was decided the same day as Benton v. Maryland, see
note 14 supra.
17 395 U.S. at 719-20, citing United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
18 395 U.S. at 720 (emphasis within; footnote omitted).
19 Id. -at 724, citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968).
20 Id. at 723.
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[V]indictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his
first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new
trial. And since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter
a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal[1] or collaterally attack his first
conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of appre-
hension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing
judge.22
Recognizing that proof of the existence of a retaliatory motive on the part of the
trial judge would be extremely difficult, 23 the Court made its decision more
explicit:
In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we have concluded that
whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after
a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must alffnratively appear. Those
reasons must be based upon objective infonnation concerning identifiable
conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original
sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased
sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional
legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal.2 4
As previously noted, the federal courts which have confronted the issue
under consideration have relied on Green or Pearce. Hence, a given case is
typically seen to tun on whether the judge impliedly acquits (Green) the de-
fendant of the greater offense when he accepts the latter's plea of guilty to the
lesser included offense, or whether the chilling effect on appeals that the vin-
dictiveness of a court might have at sentencing (Pearce) is just as real and im-
permissible where the prosecution is not similarly limited upon recharging.
This note will conclude with the suggestion that Green is dispositively in-
apposite to the situation of conviction by guilty plea, in that the latter does not
fairly give rise to an implication of acquittal of the more serious charge. It will
also be suggested that the key to Pearce was "vindictiveness" and that therefore
it is necessary to limit the preclusive effect of an extension of the Pearce principle
to the prosecutor to those situations which would give rise to an inference of
vindictive behavior by the prosecutor-
II. The Green Analogy: Implied Acquittal and Former Jeopardy
A. Courts Rejecting the Green Analogy
The first consideration of the validity of an analogy to the Green theory of
implied acquittal came in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Ward v.
Page.25 The defendant was indicted by a grand jury in Oklahoma for first-degree
21 Note that while the Supreme Court has never held that the states are constitutionally
compelled to grant appellate review to the criminal defendant, once such avenues are estab-
lished by a state sua sponte, they must be kept free of impediment or discrimination. Rinaldi
v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
22 395 U.S. at 725 (footnote omitted).
23 Id. at 726.
24 Id.
25 424 F.2d 491 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 917 (1970).
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murder. He pleaded not guilty and the case went to trial. However, after two
days of trial the defendant was allowed to enter a plea of guilty to first-degree
manslaughter, and was sentenced to serve forty years. Subsequently, Ward
brought state habeas corpus proceedings seeking to have his conviction set aside
on the grounds that his plea was involuntary, based upon promises made by the
prosecution and tacitly by the trial judge.2" After the appeal in the state courts
proved unavailing, a federal district court eventually ruled that his plea of guilty
had indeed been involuntary.27 The state chose to retry him on the original
charge, first-degree murder. He was convicted by a jury and this time sentenced
to life imprisonment. Ward again appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals. Although that court found, upon the particular facts of the case, that
the state was estopped to retry him for murder, nevertheless, rather than reverse,
it held that implicit in the jury's conviction for murder was a finding of guilt
of manslaughter, and simply reduced the sentence to the original forty years.2
Ward filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court. It was denied and he appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Relying on the Green theory of implied acquittal,29 he contended that his retrial
for murder exposed him to double jeopardy in violation of his right to due process
of law under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
However, the Ward court was not moved by the fact that the defendant's
situation was "facially analogous" to that of the defendant in Green."0 The court
noted that the rule there established was that the jury which is able to convict
on the greater offense impliedly acquits the defendant of that offense when it
26 Ward v. Raines, 360 P.2d 953 (Okla. Cr. 1961).
27 Ward v. Page, 238 F. Supp. 431 (D. Okla. 1965).
28 Ward v. State, 444 P.2d 255, 260-62 (Okla. Cr. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1040
(1969).
29 Actually, the court more frequently analogized to Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969), than it did to Green. In Benton, the Supreme Court, following Green, held that the
retrial for both burglary and larceny after a jury had acquitted the defendant of larceny at
the first trial was a violation of double jeopardy as to the latter charge. And as it had done
in Green, the Court held that the state may not condition "an appeal of one offense on a
coerced surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense." 395 U.S. at 796.
Hence, the court in Ward was concerned that there first be a valid plea of former jeopardy.
Since Green involved an implied acquittal of the greater offense of first-degree murder while
Benton dealt with an express acquittal on a separate count, it would seem that the former is,
factually, more nearly apposite to Ward's situation. Nevertheless, the court chose to rely on
Benton, probably because, unlike Green, that case involved a state conviction as did Ward. See
note 14 supra. To avoid confusion, the writer has referred simply to Green in the text.
30 The Court also relied on its own decision, Booker v. Phillips, 418 F.2d 424 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 910 (1970). In Booker, it was held the rationale of Green precluded
the state of Kansas from retrying the defendant for first-degree murder after he had been once
tried for that offense and the jury had found him guilty of first-degree manslaughter, even
though he was again convicted only of first-degree manslaughter at the second trial. The Court
held:
The fact that unlike the situation in Green v. United States, the appellant here
has not been convicted of a greater offense at the second trial is of no consequence
.... It is not the conviction of the greater offense but the reprosecution for the of-
fense that is repugnant to the Constitution. Stated conversely, it is not important
that the defendant may have successfully run the gauntlet for a second time; what is
critical is that he should not have been required to run again at all.
418 F.2d at 426. The following year the Supreme Court similarly held in Price v. Georgia,
398 U.S. 323 (1970). (The defendant in Price had actually received a lighter sentence on his
second conviction.) For a similar case, which was cited in both Booker and Price, see United
States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913
(1966).
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returns a verdict of guilty of the lesser included offense. And while the defendant
waives the defense of former jeopardy by appealing his conviction, that waiver
does not extend to an offense of which he was acquitted. However, since "absent
an acquittal on the greater offense, a criminal defendant may be retried, after
reversal on appeal, for all the charges in the original indictment,""1 the court
reasoned that the sine qua non of a valid invocation of the Green theory was an
acquittal. This was believed to be the dispositive distinction in the present case:
Ward had been convicted of the lesser included offense on a plea of guilty. "It
is true," the court noted, "that a guilty plea is as final as a jury verdict but the
double jeopardy implications reverberating from a guilty plea and a jury verdict
are not identical."32 As the court found no basis for implying that Ward had
been acquitted of first-degree murder where his prior conviction was pursuant to
a plea of guilty to manslaughter, it held that Oklahoma did not violate Ward's
right not to be placed twice in jeopardy, and affirmed his conviction.
While the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has not ruled on the issue under
consideration, at least one lower court in that circuit has rejected the theory that
an accepted plea of guilty to a lesser offense gives rise to an implication of
acquittal on the greater charge. In Harris v. Anderson,"" the defendant had
been convicted of common law robbery after he had withdrawn his plea of guilty
to the lesser offense of larceny from the person. Harris contended that the state's
acquiescence in his plea of guilty to the lesser offense was an implied acquittal
of the greater offense. The court rejected the defendant's "clever" argument,
however, and held:
A withdrawn guilty plea is a nullity; the state cannot use the withdrawn
plea as an admission in evidence, Kercheval v. United States.[P4] In like
token, the defendant should not be allowed to make use of it in the manner
desired here. It was up to him to assess the weight of the evidence against
- him and to determine whether or not he wished to risk trial on the charges
set out in the indictmentL 5
However, the characterization of a guilty plea as "a nullity" proves too
much. In Benton v. Maryland,3 6 the Supreme Court, following Green, held that
the state may not condition "an appeal of one offense on a coerced surrender of
a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense."37 Maryland argued that
Green did not apply because Benton's previous jury conviction of burglary had
been pursuant to an absolutely void indictment, and that he could not have been
placed in jeopardy by a void indictment. Nevertheless, the Court stated: "This
argument sounds a bit strange, however, since the petitioner could quietly have
served out his sentence under this 'void' indictment had he not appealed his
burglary conviction."3 Hence, whereas a void indictment may be a nullity in
31 424 F.2d at 493.
32 Id.
33 364 F. Supp. 465 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
34 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
35 364 F. Supp. at 465.
36 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
37 Id. at 796. See note 29 supra.
38 Id.
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some contexts, the Court in Benton refused to so treat it for purposes of former
jeopardy. Similarly, while a withdrawn guilty plea may be a nullity in that it may
not be admitted as evidence in a trial, it does not automatically follow that, while
the plea stood, it did not carry any jeopardy overtones.
The Harris court also seemed to place great weight on the fact that the
defendant had stood trial on the greater charge as a result of "his own indepen-
dent initiative and decision to withdraw his plea." 9 However, this clearly sounds
like waiver, and, in light of Green and Benton, as noted above, is not a valid
response to an argument of former jeopardy.
While both the Ward and the Harris courts arrived at the same result, the
cases are certainly factually distinguishable in that judgment had been entered
prior to withdrawal of the guilty plea in Ward, whereas in Harris, the plea was
withdrawn before judgment had been entered. However, this distinction should
not be of dispositive proportion to a former jeopardy argument. The Supreme
Court has held in Boykin v. Alabama0 that a plea of guilty "is itself a conviction;
nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.""1 Hence, if
a plea of guilty to a lesser included offense is "itself a conviction" of that offense,
it would seem to make no difference, for purposes of ascertaining whether that
conviction operates as an implied acquittal of the greater offense, whether judg-
ment was pronounced before or after withdrawal of the plea.
B. Courts Adopting the Green Theory of Implied Acquittal
In arriving at its result, the Ward court stated, ". . [W]e have found no
cases, and appellant alludes to no authority, which suggests that a guilty plea
to a lesser offense operates as an acquittal on all greater offenses."42 The lack of
authority was changed the next day, however, by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Mullreed v. Kropp."
In Mullreed, the defendant was initially charged with armed robbery based
on allegations that he and an accomplice had struck a female bar attendant with
a chair and then fled with $40 from a cash register. At arraignment, Mull-
reed requested appointed counsel and then stood mute as the court entered
a plea of not guilty, stating that it would take the matter of counsel under advise-
ment. Shortly thereafter, having serious misgivings as to whether a chair would
constitute a dangerous weapon pursuant to the Michigan armed robbery statute,"
the prosecutor informed the defendant that he was adding a second count to
the information, the lesser offense of unarmed robbery. Mullreed pleaded guilty
to the second count and was sentenced to serve 10 to 15 years in the state
prison. Subsequently, he waged a successful collateral attack on his conviction
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan arguing
that notwithstanding his request for counsel he had been sentenced without such
39 364 U.S. at 466.
40 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
41 Id. at 242.
42 424 F.2d at 493.
43 425 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1970).
44 MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.529 (1948).
[June 1975]
assistance.41 However, upon his release Mullreed was immediately arrested and
recharged with armed robbery, the first count in the original information. He
was then tried by a jury, convicted, and sentenced this time to serve 15 to
30 years. A writ of habeas corpus having been denied by the Michigan courts
as well as the federal district court, Mullreed petitioned the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, alleging that the conviction of armed robbery was a violation of the
double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.
Like its Tenth Circuit counterpart in Ward, the Mullreed court saw the
controlling issue to be whether the defendant stood convicted of an offense of
which he had been previously "acquitted." However, unlike the Ward court,
it refused to take such a restrictive view of an accepted guilty plea:
Stripped to its essence, we have in this case a situation where the court has
sentenced Mullreed on a lesser included offense pursuant to his plea of
guilty. The difference between this case and Benton[ 6] is that in that case
a jury had made an express acquittal. In Green, the verdict was silent as
to the first degree murder charge, upon which the Court held that the
defendant had been acquitted. The State urges these as distinctions of con-
stitutional dimensions. We think not. We hold that the situation here in
substance is not distinguishable from Benton and Green.
47
The coures theory was that since Michigan statutes and court rules require that
a judge not accept a guilty plea unless he is satisfied that there is a "factual
basis" for the plea,' and since the defendant was originally convicted of a crime
statutorily defined as one committed by a robber "not being armed with a
dangerous weapon, ' 49 Mullreed's conviction pursuant to that statute necessarily
involved an affirmative finding that he had not committed "armed" robbery,
just as the jury verdict in Green had constituted a finding that the defendant had
not committed first-degree murder.
The Sixth Circuit followed Mullreed in Rivers v. Lucas,50 where it stated
that the former had established that "for purposes of testing a double jeopardy
plea there is no difference between the jury's refusal to convict on the more
serious charge and a court's implicit refusal to do so when it accepts a guilty plea
to a lesser included offense."'"
In Rivers it was held that where the defendant was charged with first-degree
murder and was convicted pursuant to a plea of guilty to manslaughter, his sub-
sequent successful attack on that conviction did not enable the State of Michigan
to retry him for the more serious charge. The court pointed out that shortly after
Mullreed had been announced the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Price
v. Georgia.52 Price had emphasized that the prohibition against double jeopardy
45 Mullreed v. Bannan. 137 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Mich. 1956).
46 For a brief discussion of Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), see notes 14 & 29
supra.
47 425 F.2d at 1101-02.
48 MiCH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 768.35 (1948); MicH. GENERAL COURT RULE 785.3(2).
49 MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.529 (1948).
50 477 F.2d 199 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 414 U.S. 896(1973).
51 477 F.2d at 202.
52 398 U.S. 323 (1970).
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was a protection against the "risk of conviction" of an offense of which one has
been acquitted.13 Apparently believing that Price added strength to its decision
in Mullreed,"4 the court held:
The continuation principle of jeopardy makes it possible for appellee Rivers
to be tried again for the same offense of which he was convicted by his
guilty plea (manslaughter), but his successful appeal did not open the way
for him to be once again subjected to the risk of a prosecution for murder.55
However, the State of Michigan contended that another post-Mulireed
Supreme Court decision, Santobello v. New York,56 had overruled Mullreed. In
Santobello, the defendant had been indicted on two felony counts. Pursuant to
a plea bargain, he pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense in return for the
prosecutor's promise not to make any recommendation as to sentence. Sub-
sequently, the defendant unsuccessfully sought to have his plea withdrawn when
a different prosecutor recommended the maximum sentence. However, the
Supreme Court held that the second prosecutor's lack of privity to the agree-
merit was no excuse for his not honoring the plea-inducing promise made by his
predecessor."
To be sure, Santobello was concerned with the ramifications for the volun-
tariness of a negotiated guilty plea of a breach of the agreement by a subsequent
prosecutor. However, Michigan's claim in Rivers that Santobello had "over-
ruled" Mullreed was based on a dictum by the Santobello Court. In remanding
the case to the New York courts to decide whether to grant specific performance
of the plea bargain or to allow Santobello to withdraw his plea of guilty to the
lesser included offense, the Court had stated in a footnote: "if the state decides
to allow withdrawal of the plea, the petitioner will, of course, plead anew to
the original charge ... .""8 However, the Rivers court dismissed the contention
that this dictum was necessarily inconsistent with its holding in Mullreed, by
pointing out that while the Court had stated that upon withdrawal the defen-
dant would plead anew to the original charge, "the Court did not say, or even
intimate, that he could not plead the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy as a bar to prosecution on the more serious of the two counts."5"
Rivers was decided April 24, 1973. The State of Michigan appealed.
However, on June 18, 1973, the Supreme Court of Michigan decided People v.
McMiller.60 Prior to McMiller, the law in Michigan, by virtue of several courts
of appeals decisions,6 was that the state may reinstate the greater charge after
53 Id. at 329. See note 30 supra.
54 However, similar to Green, in Price it was the jury's conviction on manslaughter which
gave rise to the implication of acquittal for murder. Hence, any analogy to Price still begs the
question of whether the same inference is appropriate in the context of the guilty plea.
55 477 F.2d at 202.
56 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
57 Id. at 262.
58 Id. at 263 n.2.
59 477 F.2d at 202. On remand in Santobello, the state court ordered specific performance
of the plea arrangement; hence, the double jeopardy issue never developed. People v. Santo-
bello, 39 App. Div. 654, 331 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1972).
60 389 Mich. 425, 208 N.W.2d 451 (1973).
61 See, e.g., People v. Harper, 32 Mich. App. 73, 188 N.W.2d 254 (1971); People v. Burt,
29 Mich. App. 275, 185 N.W.2d 207 (1970).
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the defendant's plea of guilty to the lesser included offense is vacated. However,
the Michigan Supreme Court had not ruled on the issue; and when it did in
McMiller, it overruled those decisions. Although it explicitly rejected the double
jeopardy rationale of Mullreed and Rivers, 2 the court held: "[U]pon the accep-
tance of a plea of guilty, as a matter of policy, the state may not thereafter
charge a higher offense arising out of the same transaction." 3 On October 15,
1973, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on Rivers, 4 and in
the same order vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and
remanded the case to that court for a consideration of whether it had been
mooted by McMiller. On remand, the case was declared moot, without opinion.
However, notwithstanding that Rivers was ultimately vacated as moot,
Mullreed still stands; and the language of the court in Rivers leaves no doubt
that the rule in the Sixth Circuit will remain that a conviction by plea of guilty
to a lesser included offense places the defendant in jeopardy on the greater of-
fense and, as such, the prohibition against double jeopardy prevents his being
"retried" for the greater offense following a successful attack on his guilty plea."s
While in the Tenth Circuit, Ward u. Page established that retrial on the greater
offense is not barred since the reverberations from a plea of guilty to a lesser
included offense are not seen to be the same as those from a jury verdict, thus
leaving no rational basis for a finding of implied acquittal. And although the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed the issue, at least one lower
court in that circuit, in Harris zy. Anderson, has ruled consistent with Ward.66
C. Criticism of the Double Jeopardy Theory
The fifth amendment prohibition against double jeopardy, which was held
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
62 389 Mich. at 430, 208 N.W.2d at 452.
63 389 Mich. at 434, 208 N.W.2d at 454.
64 Lucas v. Rivers, 414 U.S. 896 (1973).
65 For an analysis of the Sixth Circuit rule, see Comment, 7 IND. L. REv. 761 (1974).
66 A dictum by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also suggests a predisposition toward
the Ward result:
We have grave doubts as to [the defendant's] pressing his motion for leave to with-
draw his plea. If he is ultimately successful, we know of nothing to prevent the
government from reviving the two counts which were dismissed by the trial judge.
United States v. Wells, 430 F.2d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1970). See also ABA STANDARDS, The
Prosecution Function § 4.3 (1971):
Fulfillment of Plea Discussions.... (c) If the prosecutor finds he is unable to fulfill
an understanding previously agreed upon in plea discussions, he should give notice
promptly to the defendant and cooperate in securing leave of the court for the defen-
dant to withdraw any plea and take other steps appropriate to restore the defendant
to the position he was in before the understanding was reached or plea made.
Note also that while the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has not ruled on whether double
jeopardy bars prosecution of the greater offense after the defendant succeeds in overturning
his conviction of the lesser offense by plea of guilty, that court has ruled on a similar issue. In
United States v. Rines, 453 F.2d 878 (1971), the court held that the dismissal of a count
charging assault on a federal officer, at the time of sentencing in consideration for a plea of
guilty to a count charging knowing and unlawful entry of a federally insured bank with intent
to commit robbery and larceny, and reindictment on the assault charge after the defendant
had withdrawn his guilty plea, did not place the defendant twice in jeopardy on the latter
charge. Id. at 880.
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ment in Benton v. Maryland,"7 is threefold." It prohibits multiple punishments
for the same offense. 9 It prohibits a second prosecution for the same offense
after conviction (former conviction)." And it prohibits a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal (former acquittal)."
In relation to the issue presently under consideration, that is whether the
defense of double jeopardy is available to one who has been convicted of the
greater offense following the reversal of his conviction pursuant to a plea of
guilty to the lesser offense, it is clear that an allegation of multiple punishment
is inappropriate. 2 Likewise, the plea of former conviction is unavailable as the
defendant has not previously been convicted of the greater offense."3 Hence,
it is apparent that the defense of double jeopardy will lie here only if the defen-
dant is entitled to the benefit of the former acquittal plea.
The Supreme Court based its decision in Green on alternative grounds:
(1) the verdict of guilty of second-degree murder was an implicit acquittal of
the charge of first-degree murder;74 (2) the dismissal of the jury without the
defendant's consent marked the end of his jeopardy for first-degree murder."
Neither of these theories is appropriate to the situation of conviction by plea.
When the implied acquittal theory is applied to the guilty plea situation
under consideration, the issue becomes whether the acceptance by the court of
a guilty plea to a lesser offense gives rise to the same implications regarding the
greater charge that a jury verdict was held to present in Green. As noted above,
the Sixth Circuit, in Mullreed and Rivers, has clearly answered in the affirm-
ative: "[F]or purposes of testing a double jeopardy plea there is no difference
between the jury's refusal to convict on the more serious charge and a court's
implicit refusal to do so when it accepts a guilty plea to a lesser included of-
fense." 6 On the other hand, on facts similar to those in Rivers, the Tenth Cir-
cuit rejected this reasoning in Ward, finding no basis for an implication of
acquittal: "It is true that a guilty plea is as final as a jury verdict but the double
67 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
68 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75
YALE L. J. 262, 265-66 (1965).
69 United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931) ; Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
163, 169 (1874).
70 In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 189 (1889).
71 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S.
662, 669 (1896).
72 For an example of a situation where this protection has been held to be a defense,
see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-19 (1969): "We hold that the constitutional
guarantee against multiple punishments for the same offense absolutely requires that punish-
ment already exacted must be fully 'credited' in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for
the same offense" (footnote omitted).
73 Of course it is indisputable, at least since United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896),
that no doubt jeopardy claim will lie to prevent reprosecution for the same offense where the
defendant has succeeded in getting his first conviction set aside. This rule, typically referred to
as the "Ball principle" is alternatively supported either on the theory that, by successfully at-
tacking his erroneous conviction, the defendant waives the protection against being retried, or
on the theory that jeopardy "continues" until the final settlement of any one prosecution -
the idea being that the double jeopardy bar is aimed not at successive "trials," but at succes-
sive "prosecutions." See generally Mayers & Yarborough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Suc-
cessive Prosecutions, 74 Hasv. L. Rnv. 1 (1960); Comment, Double jeopardy: A New Trial
After Appellate Reversal for Insufficient Evidence, 31 U. CHrr. L. LEv. 365 (1964).
74 355 U.S. at 190.
75 Id. at 191.
76 Rivers v. Lucas, 477 F.2d 199, 202 (6th Cir. 1973).
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jeopardy implications reverberating from a guilty plea and a jury verdict are
not identical.""7
The preferability of the Tenth Circuit's reasoning is compelling. The Sixth
Circuit's analogy to Green is specious and reflective of a misunderstanding of the
rationale there employed by the Court.
The bare bones of a valid plea of former acquittal or implied acquittal are
an opportunity to convict, coupled with a refusal to do so. In Green the Court
noted:
Green was in direct peril of being convicted and punished for first
degree murder at his first trial He was forced to run the gauntlet once on
that charge and the jury refused to convict him. When given the choice
between finding him guilty of either first or second degree murder, it chose
the latter.73
Significantly, the jury had a "choice." It had the opportunity to convict on the
first-degree-murder charge but refused. It was the declined opportunity, or elec-
tion against, which gave rise to the implication of acquittal and allowed the
Court to treat the situation as "if the jury [had] returned a verdict which express-
ly read: 'We find the defendant not guilty of murder in the first degree but
guilty of murder in the second degree.' M9
Hence, to favorably analogize the conviction of a lesser offense by guilty
plea to Green is to demand the untenable assumption that the trial judge who
accepts the defendant's plea to the lesser offense has a concomitant "choice" of
finding the defendant guilty of the greater offense. For only then may the defen-
dant fairly be said to have been placed in jeopardy on that charge."0 Certainly
no one can argue that the judge who is tendered a plea of guilty to manslaughter
has the option of responding with a conviction of murder.8 ' The trial judge's
77 424 F.2d at 493.
78 355 U.S. at 190.
79 Id. at 191.
80 See People v. McMiller, 389 Mich. 425, 431, 208 N.W.2d 451, 453 (1973), where on
facts similar to those in Rivers, the Supreme Court of Michigan rejected the implied acquittal
theory of Mullreed and Rivers. The court held:
Unlike a jury trial, a choice was not offered to the independent fact finder [trial
judge] to find him guilty of murder, first or second, or manslaughter. It is this
"choice" of the fact finder that provides the basis for the implication of acquittal.
It is the exposure to it that puts one in "jeopardy."
And Justice Brennan stated in a dissenting opinion: "[A] plea of guilty is made by the de-
fendant himself. It cannot be said that he has impliedly acquitted himself of the higher charge
by his plea to the lesser offense." 389 Mich. at 437, 208 N.W.2d at 455 (dissenting opinion).
Note, however, that the McMiller court reached the same result as Mullreed and Rivers, but
on a policy rationale. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
81 In Commonwealth v. Therrien, 359 Mass. 500, 269 N.E.2d 687 (1971), the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts had occasion to rule on this issue and held:
Unlike the jury in the Green case, the judge here did not have the option to
find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder. His only choice was to accept or
reject the plea to second-degree murder. Had he rejected it, the defendant would
then have been tried to a jury on the first-degree-murder charge. No one would
reasonably argue that a jury trial following rejection of a guilty plea to second-degree
murder would be barred because of former jeopardy on the ground that the judge
by rejecting the plea had inferentially found the defendant guilty of first-degree mur-
der .... The question of guilt of first-degree murder was one which the judge did
not have the power to decide, and one which was never before him. Therefore the
defendant was never placed in jeopardy by the judge's consideration of his guilty
plea of anything more than that to which he pleaded guilty.
359 Mass. at 504-05, 269 N.E.2d at 690-91.
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fact-finding responsibility in such situations is to determine whether or not
there is a factual basis for the plea, 2 and cannot reasonably be thought to extend
to the ascertainment of guilt or innocence of an offense which is not before him.
Thus, it is not the conviction per se of a lesser offense, but the declined
opportunity to convict on the greater offense which occasions the implication
of acquittal of the latter. As the Court held in Green: ". . . Green's claim of
former jeopardy is not based on his previous conviction for second-degree murder
but instead on the original jury's refusal to convict him of first-degree murder."ss
Hence, as it cannot reasonably be said that the judge who accepts a plea
of guilty to a lesser offense thereby "refuses to convict" on the greater offense,
there would seem to be no basis for an implication of acquittal on the latter.
Consequently, prosecution for the greater offense, following a vacation of the
plea of guilty, should not be barred on the grounds of former jeopardy.
Nor is the alternative ground given as support for the Green decision rea-
sonably available to the defendant convicted by a plea. While the greater part
of the Green opinion was devoted to the implied acquittal theory, the Court
gave an alternative ground of support for the result reached:
[-]ere, the jury was dismissed without returning any express verdict on that
charge [first-degree murder] and without Green's consent. Yet it was given
a full opportunity to return a verdict and no extraordinary circumstances
appeared which prevented it from doing so. Therefore, it seems clear,
under established principles of former jeopardy, that Green's jeopardy for
first-degree murder came to an end when the jury was discharged so that
he could not be retried for that offense.8 4
While the court did not expound on this theory, it was obviously referring to
the long-established rule that it is not essential that a verdict of guilt or inno-
cence be returned for a defendant to have been once placed in jeopardy so as to
bar a second trial on the same charge. That is, the defendant is generally
regarded as having been placed in jeopardy when the jury has been empanelled
and sworn, or, in the case of trial to the court, when the judge begins to hear
82 FED. R. CrIM. P. 11 provides in pertinent part: "The court shall not enter a judg-
ment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea." For
a similar state provision, see MICHIGAN GENERAL CouRT RULE 785.3(2). See also ABA
STANDARDS, The Function of the Trial Judge § 4.2 (1972).
83 355 U.S. at 190 n.11. It will be recalled that the Sixth Circuit held in Mullreed that
the trial judge had impliedly acquitted the defendant of armed robbery when he accepted his
plea of guilty to unarmed robbery, and that, therefore, a subsequent prosecution for the greater
charge following the vacation of the guilty plea violated the defendant's fifth amendment pro-
tection against double jeopardy. 425 F.2d at 1102. Additionally, however, making reference
to the above quote from Green, the court seemed to be propounding an independent theory of
estoppel based on the state's original refusal to prosecute on the greater charge. The court
stated: "For purposes of the present appeal it was not the conviction on [the lesser charge]
which is crucial here; rather it is the State's relinquishment of its rights, or its refusal, to
prosecute on [the greater charge]." Id. at 1099. However, there would seem to be little basis,
for purposes of former jeopardy, for an analogy of a state's refusal to prosecute to a jury's
refusal to convict. It has long been the rule that the mere indictment for an offense does not
place one in jeopardy. Bassing v. Cady, 208 U.S. 386 (1908). Hence, it is difficult to under-
stand how the relinquishment of the right to proceed on that indictment in any way aids a
finding of former jeopardy.
84 355 U.S. at 191 (citation omitted).
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evidence."5 And, a subsequent dismissal without the defendant's consent sn or
in the absence of "manifest necessity" ' will be with prejudice8s
However, to favorably analogize this principle to the proceeding at which
the defendant's plea of guilty to a lesser included offense is being considered would
be to presume that the defendant were on trial for the greater charge. That is,
it assumes that when the judge makes his Rule 1111 determination, he is not
merely ascertaining the presence uel non of a factual basis for the plea of guilty
to the lesser included offense, but is "beginning to hear the evidence" on the
greater offense with an eye toward and the opportunity of determination of
guilt or innocence of the latter charge as well. For only then might the defendant
validly claim to have been placed in jeopardy on that charge. The most basic
awareness of the plea bargaining and conviction by guilty plea processes compels
the conclusion that such reasoning is legal fiction of the greatest sort. In deciding
whether he will accept the defendant's guilty plea to the lesser offense, the trial
judge has neither the purpose nor the opportunity to convict on the greater
charge.
Neither Green nor its progeny lend support to the argument that a convic-
tion by plea of guilty to a lesser offense bars a subsequent prosecution for the
greater offense following a successful attack by the defendant on the original
conviction. Such a defendant has never before run the "risk or hazard" of con-
viction on the greater charge.9 He has never been "jeopardized" on that charge,
nor, a fortiori, has he been acquitted of it.
III. The Extension of Pearce
As previously stated,92 some courts have relied on the Supreme Court deci-
sion in North Carolina uz. Pearce' to decide whether a defendant may be pros-
ecuted for the greater offense following a successful attack on his plea of guilty
to the lesser offense. In Pearce, the Supreme Court held that, while the imposi-
tion of a higher sentence after retrial is not per se unconstitutional, a violation
of due process does result where the harsher sentence is the result of vindictiveness
on the part of the trial judge against the defendant for the latter's having success-
fully attacked his first conviction. 4 And since it was also thought that the very
85 United States v. Kimbrew, 380 F.2d 538, 540 (6th Cir. 1967); Hunter v. Wade, 169
F.2d 973, 975 (10th Cir. 1948), aff'd 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
86 It would seem that the defendant who has withdrawn his plea could hardly contend
that "dismissal" was without his consent.
87 United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
88 See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100(1904).
89 The assumption that such a defendant is on trial for the greater offense is indeed diffi-
cult to make when it is realized that he is not even "on trial" for the lesser offense. See Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970), where the Supreme Court noted that one facet
of the guilty plea is that it signifies "the defendant's consent that judgment of conviction may
be entered without a trial-a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or judge" (emphasis
added).
90 FED. R. CRim. P. 11. See note 82 supra.
91 Cf. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970).
92 See text accompanying notes 16 through 24 supra.
93 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
94 Id. at 725.
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fear of such a retaliatory motive would be an affront to due process by virtue
of its chilling effect on the defendant's right to appeal, the Court held that an
increased sentence following retrial may be justified only where the record
affirmatively reflects that the higher sentence was in response to identifiable
intervening conduct of the defendant.95
A. Extending the Pearce Principle to the Prosecutor
The first attempt to resolve the issue under consideration by an extension
of the Pearce principle to the prosecutor came just three weeks after Pearce in
Sefcheck v. Brewer." In Sefcheck, the defendant was charged with uttering a
false check. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to serve not more than seven
years Subsequently, he appealed his conviction on the grounds that his plea
had not been entered personally (he was in prison at the time), nor in the pres-
ence of counsel. His plea was voided and the charge was dismissed. However,
the county attorney immediately brought a new information, this time for a
greater offense-uttering a forged instrument. The defendant pleaded not guilty,
was convicted by a jury, and given a mandatory sentence of not more than 10
years. On petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa, Sefcheck contended that his conviction
for uttering a forged instrument was, inter alia, a violation of the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment and that its effect was an impermissible condition-
ing of his right to appeal.
Passing over the double jeopardy argument, the court held that Pearce was
controlling and invalidated the defendant's conviction on the higher charge. 8
The court's theory was that there was no meaningful distinction between Pearce,
where the defendants were retried on the same charges and given greater sentences
than had been given on their original voided convictions, and the case before
it, where after the defendant's initial conviction was voided, he was tried for a
different offense carrying a greater punishment.9 The effect was thought to be
the same in either case-an impermissible burden on the right to attack one's
conviction. Hence the court held:
This same principle must apply to all state officials, including the county
attorney. Fear that the county attorney may vindictively increase the charge
would act to unconstitutionally deter the exercise of the right of appeal or
collateral attack as effectively as fear of a vindictive increase in sentence by
the court.100
95 Id. at 726.
96 301 F. Supp. 793 (S.D. Ia. 1969). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not
yet ruled as to whether either Green or Pearce prevents the prosecutor from recharging the
greater offense after the defendant has succeeded in invalidating his plea of guilty to the lesser
included offense.
97 It should be noted that Sefcheck is distinguishable from the cases previously discussed,
as well as from those which follow, in that here the defendant was originally charged with only
the lesser offense. This distinction will be dealt with below.
98 301 F. Supp. at 794-95.
99 Id. at 795 (footnote omitted).
100 Id.
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Nevertheless, under Pearce the judge is not absolutely precluded from giv-
ing a higher sentence upon retrial;... however, he may do so only if justification
for the same affirmatively appears in the record in the form of identifiable inter-
vening conduct of the defendant.112 By analogy, the Sefcheck court provided a
similar opportunity to the prosecutor but found no "legally justifiable, com-
pelling reason" for his having brought the higher charge and invalidated the
resulting conviction.20
3
The Sefcheck court found it impermissible for a prosecutor to follow a
defendant's successful attack on his conviction by bringing a higher charge
than he had brought ab initio. However, when the propriety vel non of an exten-
sion of Pearce to the prosecutor came before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in United States ex rel. Williams v. McMann, ' 4 the facts were different and so
was the result. Circuit Judge Kaufman phrased the issue before the court as
follows:
The question before us is whether a 5 to 10 year sentence which [the defen-
dant] is currently serving because of his conviction after trial for feloniously
selling a narcotic drug is constitutionally invalid in view of the lighter in-
determinate sentence of 3 to 7 years originally imposed upon his plea of
guilty (later withdrawn) [0-5] to the lesser charge of attempted felonious sale.' 06
The court began by stating that, "Williams, with commendable candor,
recognizes that the strength of his claim derives entirely from the Supreme Court's
recent decision in [Pearce]."'"7 The court proceeded to review the holding in
Pearce and pointed out that it was not a higher sentence per se that the Supreme
Court had found constitutionally offensive in that case, but rather a higher sen-
tence imposed in retaliation for the defendant's attack on his first conviction.
And that it was to assure against such retaliation that the Court had laid down
the requirement that an increased sentence on reconviction be justified by explicit
reference to identifiable intervening conduct of the defendant. Williams argued
that since no such justification supported his increased sentence, it was invalid
under Pearce. The court quickly dismissed this contention, however, pointing
out that far from the trial judge wreaking vengeance or vindictiveness on the
defendant in violation of Pearce, the second conviction was for a greater offense.
Under New York statutory law, the judge was without discretion to award the
lighter sentence after the conviction for the greater offense. Hence, the court
held: "given this complete and obvious explanation for the longer sentence, we
see no need to demand the type of justification ordered in Pearce."'
101 395 U.S. at 723.
102 Id. at 726.
103 301 F. Supp. at 795.
104 436 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971).
105 The factor that precipitated the defendant's withdrawal of his guilty plea was the post-
sentencing discovery by the state of the defendant's prior felony record, with the resulting need
to resentence him as a recidivist. Since the prosecutor's plea-inducing prediction regarding
sentencing was now a significant underestimate, Williams was allowed to withdraw his plea. Id.
at 104.
106 Id. at 104.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 105.
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Satisfied that the judge had not violated Pearce, the court turned to the
ramifications of that decision for the prosecutor. The defendant argued that the
prosecutor's unsupported refusal to allow him to plead innocent to the lesser
charge of attempting a felonious sale created a presumption of vindictiveness
under Pearce. Citing Sefcheck, the court stated that it had "no quarrel with the
proposition that prosecutorial vindictiveness can be no less an affront to those
values we characterize as 'due process' than judicial vindictiveness."1 ' How-
ever, the court thought there was a dispositive distinction between the present
case and Sefcheck. The prosecutor in the latter case had responded to the defen-
dant's successful withdrawal of his guilty plea to the original charge by filing a
new, more serious information. Whereas, in Williams, the court reasoned, there
was no basis for an inference of vindictiveness; the original charge had been
reduced as a result of a plea bargain. When the defendant revoked his part of
the agreement, the prosecutor was "forced to proceed on the original charge.""
Circuit Judge Hays, concurring in the result,"' would have limited the
rationale to distinguishing Pearce on the ground that, unlike Pearce, here the
second trial was for a more serious offense; hence, the higher sentence was justi-
fied. In his opinion it was unwise to go further and "advance a theory that the
guilty plea situation, because it represents a bargain between the defendant and
the prosecutor, ipso facto, requires the application of different legal principles."" 2
His concern was that the majority had overlooked certain implications of Simpson
v. Rice,"' the companion case to Pearce. In Rice, the defendant had originally
been convicted by a guilty plea. Judge Hays thought it was a fair assumption that
Rice's original sentence had been a favorable reflection of a plea bargain." '
And even though by successfully attacking his plea it might have been said that
the defendant had reneged on his part of the bargain, the Supreme Court did
not deny him the benefit of that bargain, but treated his case precisely as it did
Pearce's conviction by trial. That is, the sentence imposed as a result of the plea
bargain was to be treated as the frame of reference for the ascertainment of vin-
dictiveness vel non. Hence, Judge Hays was of the opinion that Pearce was in-
applicable as distinguishable on its facts (the higher sentence here being imposed
pursuant to a conviction of a higher offense). And, in light of Rice, it was unten-
able to alternatively argue that even if Pearce is applicable, the defendant's re-
vocation of his part of the bargain was sufficient justification for a departure from
the Pearce principle.
Nevertheless, the court in Williams sustained the defendant's conviction of
the greater charge-the felonious sale of a narcotic drug. However, in so hold-
ing, the court stated: "Pearce would have application, if a prosecutor for no
valid reason charged a defendant whose first conviction had been set aside, with
109 Id. (footnote omitted).
110 Id. at 106.
111 Id. at 107 (concurring opinion).
112 Id.
113 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
114 The majority responded in a footnote, 436 F.2d at 106 n.7, pointing out that while Rice
may have hoped for favorable sentencing as a result of his pleading guilty, "there is not a hint
in the Supreme Court's opinion or in the opinions below that an express agreement had been
reached."
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a more serious offense based upon the same conduct."'1 5 This was, of course,
the precise factual situation in Sefcheck, where that court did hold the Pearce
principle controlling. Hence, it would seem that the court was tacitly endorsing
the Sefcheck holding, although it found no Pearce problem where the second
prosecution was for a charge which the prosecutor had brought ab initio."'
B. The Pearce Progeny
Since the Pearce decision in 1969, the Supreme Court has had several occa-
sions to rule on possible extensions of the principle therein established. In Golten
v. Kentucky,"' the Court was called upon to rule on the applicability to Pearce
to Kentucky's two-tier system for adjudicating certain criminal cases whereby
a defendant who has been charged with a misdemeanor may be tried first in an
inferior court, and then, if dissatisfied with the outcome, may, without the need
to allege error, have a trial de novo in a court of general jurisdiction. Emphasiz-
ing that Pearce was directed at insuring the absence of "vindictiveness" on the
part of the sentencing judge against the defendant who had successfully attacked
his conviction, the Court noted:
The court which conducted Colten's trial and imposed the final sentence
was not the court with whose work Colten was sufficiently dissatisfied to
115 426 F.2d at 105.
116 Although not in the context of a voided guilty plea, the Second Circuit again had
occasion to rule on the limiting effects of the Pearce principle in United States v. Mallah, 503
F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1974). Mallah involved several defendants and a multitude of issues relat-
ing to drug convictions. However, one defendant, Pacelli, had been convicted of conspiracy
in the sale of cocaine, as well as various related substantive counts. Subsequently, his convic-
tions were reversed on the grounds that an accomplice-witness had testified at his trial md
denied having been promised anything by the government, when, in fact, he had been prom-
ised immunity. Whereupon, the prosecutor brought similar charges, this time, however, in-
volving heroin. Pacelli was convicted of those charges and appealed contending that the
substitution of the more serious charges was a vindictive response to his having embarrassed the
district attorney's office by his disclosure that it had promised the witness-accomplice im-
munity while purporting otherwise.
While stating that in Williams it had recognized that the Pearce principle was applicable
"to enhanced charges as well as to enhanced sentences," 503 F.2d at 987, the court again, as
it had done in Williams, refused to invalidate the convictions. Noting that it might be a dis-
positively different case if, for example, the government had added to a previous charge of
selling narcotics a charge of selling those same narcotics to a minor, id. at 988, the court held:
It is one thing to increase a charge for manslaughter to murder, and quite an-
other to charge a defendant, subsequent to a successful appeal, with a second murder.
In the words of Williams, "Pearce would have application, if a prosecutor . . .
charged a defendant whose first conviction had been set aside, with a more serious
offense based upon the same conduct," 436 F.2d at 105 (emphasis added). Here, the
heroin counts are based upon acts which are distinct from [the cocaine charges] pre-
viously brought against appellant. The government's decision to prosecute appellant
for [the heroin charges] is well within the traditionally broad ambit of prosecutorial
discretion.
503 F.2d at 988 (emphasis within).
Hence, while the Second Circuit has yet to reverse a conviction on the basis of a prosecu-
tion violation of the Pearce principle, its language in both Williams and Mallah leaves little
doubt but that it is so predisposed where the situation is sufficiently indicative of vindictive-
ness. The court's extraction of the Williams language, regarding the applicability of Pearce to
the prosecutor, without reference to the fact that Williams involved a voided guilty plea sug-
gests that the court is of the opinion that the nature of the original voided conviction-that
is, whether by plea or by trial-is irrelevant to a Pearce-type determination.
117 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
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seek a different result on appeal; and it is not the court that is asked to do
over what it thought it had already done correctly." s
Hence, finding that the trial de novo system did not suggest the possibility of
vindictiveness on the part of the "resentencing" judge, the Court held that Pearce
would not apply so as to require justification for the higher sentence given after
the new trial."9
Similarly, in Chaffin v. Stynchombe,"' the Court refused to extend the
Pearce principle .to the jury. The Court held12' that, in the absence of knowledge
of the prior sentence or evidence that the second sentence is otherwise the product
of vindictiveness, the rendition of a stiffer sentence by a jury on retrial does not
deny the defendant due process of law. Distinguishing Pearce, the Court noted:
As was true in Colten, the second sentence is not meted out by the same
judicial authority whose handling of the prior trial was sufficiently un-
acceptable to have required a reversal of the conviction. Thus, the jury,
unlike the judge who has been reversed, will have no personal stake in the
prior conviction and no motivation to engage in self-vindication. 2"'
Thus, finding the potential for vindictive abuse of the sentencing process by the
different jury in the second trial to be de minimis in a properly controlled court-
room, the Court refused to extend to the jury the resentencing restrictions placed
on the trial court in Pearce.
In a footnote to Chaffin,"' the Court revealed that the defendant had also
argued that a higher sentence on retrial to a jury might result from vindictive-
ness on the part of the prosecutor, expressed in the form of asking for a stiffer
sentence. However, the Court was of the opinion that the mere request for a
higher sentence than was sought at the first trial did not support an inference
of a vindictive motive:
Prosecutors often request more than they can reasonably expect to get,
knowing that the jury will customarily arrive at some compromise sentence.
The prosecutor's strategy also might well vary from case to case depending
on such factors as his assessment of the jury's reaction to the proof and to
the testimony of witnesses for and against the State. Given these practical
considerations, and constrained by the bar against his informing the jury
of the facts of prior conviction and sentence, the possibility that a harsher
sentence will be obtained through prosecutorial malice seems remote. 24
However, in the Court's most recent consideration of its holding in Pearce,
118 Id. at 116-17.
119 Note also that the Court clarified the effect of Pearce where it is applicable, in North
Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 247 (1971): "Pearce does not invalidate the conviction
[.. fbut] requires only resentencing; the conviction is not ipso facto set aside and a new trial
required."
120 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
121 Id. at 26-28.
122 Id. at 27.
123 Id. at 27 n.13.
124 Id., citing United States ex reL Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103, 105-06 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971).
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Blackledge v. Perry,125 the Court held that the prosecutor's charging discretion
may indeed be a legitimate object of the Pearce principle. As in Colten, the facts
involved a two-tier system of criminal adjudication.1 26 The facts showed that the
defendant, an inmate of a North Carolina penitentiary, had an altercation which
resulted in his being charged with the misdemeanor of assault with a deadly
weapon. Following a trial to the court in an inferior court of North Carolina's
two-tier system, Perry was convicted of the misdemeanor charge and was given
a six-month sentence to be served at the completion of the prison term he was
then serving. Following his conviction in the inferior court, he exercised his
absolute right to a trial de novo by filing a notice of appeal to the court of
general jurisdiction. However, while the defendant's appeal was pending, the
prosecutor obtained a grand jury indictment for the offense of assault with a
deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious bodily injury-a felony. The
indictment covered the same conduct as the original misdemeanor charge of
which Perry was convicted in the inferior court. He pleaded guilty to the indict-
ment and was sentenced to a term of five to seven years in the penitentiary, to be
served concurrently with the time he was then serving. 2 Subsequently, the de-
fendant petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the felony indictment
subjected him to double jeopardy and also denied him due process of law. The
district court denied the writ on the grounds that Perry had not exhausted his
state remedies. However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the
basis that any resort to the state courts would be futile as the Supreme Court of
North Carolina had consistently rejected the arguments asserted in the defen-
dant's petition.12  On remand, the district court granted the writ, holding that
the bringing of the felony indictment violated Perry's constitutional protection
from double jeopardy. The Fourth Circuit affirmed without opinion.229
The Supreme Court found it necessary to reach only the petitioner's due
process claim.' As it had done in Colten and Chaffin, the Court emphasized
that the key to Pearce was the potential for vindictiveness and limited the issue
accordingly: "The question is whether the opportunities for vindictiveness in
this situation are such as to impel the conclusion that due process of law requires
125 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
126 See text accompanying note 117 supra.
127 While it may appear intellectually suspect to follow an appeal of a misdemeanor with
a guilty plea to a felony, the Court suggested in a footnote, 417 U.S. at 23 n.2, that the appar-
ent motivation for the plea of guilty was an expectation that any sentence received pursuant
to that plea would be served concurrently with his present sentence, rather than consecutively,
as was the case on his original sentence. While this expectation was realized, the collateral
effect of applicable North Carolina law regarding the commencement-for purposes of mark-
ing time-of the sentence resulted in a bad bargain.
128 Perry v. Blackledge, 453 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1971).
129 Perry v. Blackledge, 475 F.2d 1400 (4th Cir. 1973).
130 The Supreme Court rested the decision in Perry on the due process rationale of Pearce,
and simply noted, without comment, that the district court had based its decision on double
jeopardy grounds. 417 U.S. at 24-25. In a dissenting opinion, id. at 32, justice Rehnquist
suggested that the majority so elected because of the Court's decision in Diaz v. United States,
223 U.S. 442 (1912). In Diax, the defendant was tried and convicted for assault and battery.
Subsequently, the assault victim died -nd the defendant was then tried and convicted for
homicide. The Supreme Court rejected his contention that his original trial for assault and
battery had placed him in jeopardy on the homicide charge thus barring the second prosecu-
tion on grounds of double jeopardy. Noting that at the time of the trial for assault and
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a rule analogous to that of the Pearce case.' 131 In reaching an affirmative con-
clusion to that question, the Court noted that a trial de novo would require in-
creased burdens on the prosecutor and his resources, and might even result in the
previously convicted defendant going free. As such the prosecutor was deemed to
have a significant stake in discouraging appeals. Therefore, the critical con-
cern was evident:
[I]f the prosecutor has the means readily at hand to discourage such ap-
peals--by "upping the ante" through a felony indictment whenever a con-
victed misdemeanant pursues his statutory appellate remedy-the State can
insure that only the most hardy defendants will brave the hazards of a
de novo trial.132
Hence, unlike the situation with the jury in Chaffin and the de novo judge in
Colten, the potential for vindictiveness was seen as more than "de minimis." The
Court conceded the absence of any allegation of malice or bad faith on the part
of the prosecutor in Perry, but pointed out that Pearce "was not grounded on
the proposition that actual retaliatory motivation must inevitably exist"; rather,
a legitimate "fear of such vindictiveness" is sufficient to invoke the restraints of
due process.13' Consequently, the Court extended the Pearce principle to the
prosecutor in the trial de novo situation, finding it constitutionally impermissible
for him to be able to discourage an appellant from exercising his statutory right
of appeal by increasing the charge from a misdemeanor to a felony.
Perhaps the clearest rule that can be ascertained from Pearce and its progeny
is that due process requires the imposition of Pearce-type restrictions where (1)
the situation is suggestive of the possibility of a vindictive motive (2) on the
part of one having the opportunity to realize that vindictiveness (3) in a manner
which tends to chill the exercise of a constitutional or statutory right by penal-
izing one who chooses to exercise that right, and (4) where the record is devoid
of justification in the form of objective information regarding the defendant's
intervening conduct.
battery, the victim had not yet died, and that, hence, it would have been impossible for the
authorities to have proceeded against Diaz for homicide at that trial, the Court rejected the
double jeopardy argument, holding that "the jeopardy incident to" a trial does "not extend
to an offense beyond [the trial court's] jurisdiction." Id. at 449.
In light of the apparent need to satisfactorily distinguish the Diaz jurisdictional language
to properly sustain a double jeopardy contention in the context of the two-tier system of crim-
inal adjudication, it is particularly unfortunate that the district court's decision is unreported
and that the Fourth Circuit affirmed without opinion. An awareness of the rationale employed
by the lower court might suggest a predisposition on the part of the Fourth Circuit in favor of
the Mullreed-Rivers double jeopardy approach to the guilty issue under consideration. That
is, it would seem that once a court clears the Diaz jurisdictional hurdle on the facts of the
principal case, it would be significantly past halfway home to a holding that, notwithstanding
the judge's incompetence to convict on the greater charge when he is tendered a plea of guilty
to the lesser charge, the situation is nonetheless sufficient to place the defendant in jeopardy on
the greater offense, thus barring retrial on the greater offense following a successful attack on
the guilty plea.
131 417 U.S. at 27.
132 Id. at 27-28.
133 Id. at 28.
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C. Criticism of an Extension of Pearce to the Prosecutor
Certainly, in light of the Court's holding in Perry, there is no longer a ques-
tion as to the viability of the Sefcheck and Williams holdings that the prosecutor
is just as capable of vindictively chilling the exercise of a right to appeal or col-
lateral attack as was the judge in Pearce, and, hence, is a proper object of the
Pearce principle. It is only a matter of ascertaining what situations are sufficiently
suspect to justify the extension.
Any attempt to analyze the propriety of an extension of the Pearce prin-
ciple to the prosecutor's discretion following the avoidance of a guilty plea would
seem to require a distinction between a plea of guilty to the full information,
followed by an information alleging a more serious offense based upon the same
conduct after a successful attack on the first conviction (Sefcheck" 4 ); and a
plea of guilty to a lesser offense than that of the full information which plea is
the result of negotiation, followed by reinstatement of the full information after
the plea is avoided (Williams" 5 ).
Perry would seem to be persuasive authority for an extension of Pearce to
the Sefcheck scenario. The situation is strongly suggestive of vindictiveness-the
prosecutor follows a successful attack on a guilty plea to the full original charge
with a greater charge based on the same conduct, which charge he could have
brought ab initio but did not. This is exactly what appears to have bothered the
Court in Perry. The Court stated in a footnote: "This would clearly be a dif-
ferent case if the State had shown that it was impossible to proceed on the more
serious charge at the outset.... ."" Like Perry, the Sefcheck scenario clearly
opportunes the prosecutor to wreak vengeance on the defendant for having
attacked his first conviction, and calls for a similar prophylactic rule. However,
Pearce allowed the judge to justify his higher sentence by a showing in the record
evidence of intervening conduct of the defendant which was thought to war-
rant the higher sentence, thus negating any inference of vindictiveness."' Both
Sefcheck 3  and Williams.9 provided a similar opportunity to the prosecutor.
However, the Court in Perry made no reference to this aspect of the Pearce
holding. This may be partially explainable by the fact that a given charge neces-
sarily must be based on acts committed at the time of the alleged crime, and since
the Pearce justification was limited to intervening conduct of the defendant, there
would seem to be a situation of mutual exclusion. Nevertheless, such would
not necessarily always be the case. It is suggested that it would be consistent
with the concerns of Pearce to allow the prosecutor to show that the mitigating
circumstances which prompted him to originally charge a lesser offense than
the facts warranted had been negated by intervening conduct of the defendant.
The possibility of pretentious circumvention is obvious, but could be virtually
134 See text accompanying note 96 supra.
135 See text accompanying note 104 supra.
136 417 U.S. at 29 n.7.
137 See note 15 supra.
138 301 F. Supp. at 795.
139 436 F.2d at 105.
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eliminated by a requirement of "objective information concerning identifiable
conduct" as in Pearce.
The Williams-type scenario, however, appears dispositively dissimilar. Un-
like in Sefcheck, the situation is not suggestive of a vindictive motive. The defen-
dant who reneges on his part of a plea arrangement is forced to lie in a bed
of his own making. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Williams:
When Williams was successful in revoking his part of the bargain by having
his plea of guilty set aside, it is hardly surprising, and scarcely suggestive of
vindictiveness, that the prosecution was forced to proceed on the original
charge which the grand jury had returned in the first instance .... 140
While the suggestion that the district attorney was totally devoid of discretion
was an overstatement, the fact remains that a vindictive motive is not reasonably
inferable from the mere act of reestablishing the status quo after the negotiated
plea to the lesser offense is withdrawn.
It might be suggested that such reasoning merely begs the question at hand;
that the defendant who contemplates the exercise of his right of direct or col-
lateral attack on his conviction will be discouraged from doing so if he knows
that, if he is "successful," the prosecutor may recharge the full original infor-
mation. Again, however, Pearce did not invalidate all higher sentences on re-
trial; it found a due process violation only where the higher sentence was reflec-
tive of vindictiveness of the court. As the Court noted in Perry:
The lesson that emerges from Pearce, Colten, and Chaffin is that the
Due Process Clause is not offended by all possibilities of increased punish-
ment upon retrial after appeal, but only those that pose a realistic likelihood
of "vindictiveness."''
Unlike the prosecutor who responds to the defendant's successful attack
on his guilty plea by bringing a greater information, the prosecutor who merely
reinstates the same charge which he had originally brought cannot fairly be said
to have vindictively "upped the ante." Hence, the situation does not demand
the restraints of the Pearce principle.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, it would seem that if retrial for the greater offense is to be
precluded following a successful attack on a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, the
rationale for the prohibition must be derived elsewhere than from the Green
theory of double jeopardy. Unlike the jury in Green, the court which is tendered
a plea of guilty to the lesser offense does not have the opportunity to convict
on the greater offense. Hence, it does not follow from his acceptance of that plea
that he has declined the opportunity to convict on the greater charge-thus giv-
ing rise to an implication of acquittal.
140 Id. at 106.
141 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974).
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On the other hand, an assessment of the preclusive effect of the Pearce
principle on the prosecutor's charging discretion in the wake of a voided guilty
plea requires a distinction on the basis of how that discretion was exercised
ab initio. As previously noted, the Supreme Court did not hold in Pearce or its
progeny that due process is offended whenever a second proceeding results in a
higher sentence or greater exposure, but only where such a result is obtained in
the context of a situation strongly suggestive of vindictiveness. Consequently,
any extension of Pearce as a limitation on the recharging discretion of the pros-
ecuting authority should be limited to those situations which suggest a vindictive
reprisal by the prosecutor against the defendant for having attacked his former
plea. Reinstating the full prenegotiation information-be that the greater
offense or additional charges dropped in consideration of the plea-does not
fairly give rise to an inference of a vindictive motive on the part of the prosecutor,
and, hence, should not invoke the restrictions of the Pearce principle. The
situation is different, however, where the prosecutor "ups the ante" by bringing
a charge in excess of that originally brought, based upon the same conduct. This
sequence of events is strongly suggestive of prosecutorial vindictiveness, and, in
the absence of justification in the form of an affirmative showing of objective,
intervening misconduct of the defendant, should be prohibited. In such situa-
tions, the Pearce restriction on the trial court furnishes little protection. For
example, the Sefcheck court noted that in that case, upon the defendant's con-
viction for the greater offense, under Iowa law, "the trial judge [had] no choice
of whether to increase the sentence. . . . The increased sentence in this case
flows from the actions of the prosecuting attorney, not from those of the court.""x
To condone such activity would be to dilute the effect of Pearce by enabling the
prosecutor to do precisely what was there proscribed to the trial court-penalize
a defendant for exercising his right to attack his conviction.
-Virgil L. Roth
142 301 F. Supp. at 795 n.1.
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